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30 Nov 1978, DoDD 5200.10; AGO D/A ltr, 29 Apr 1980	

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6 LESSONS LEARNED

HEADQUARTERS  
6TH BATTALION, 14TH ARTILLERY

Maj Whalen/jk/SMASHER 3

18 OACSFOR

11 Nov 66

DATE: 11 Nov 66

19 OT-RD-660314

12 9p.

SUBJECT: Operational Report, for Period ending 31 October 66.

TO: See Distribution

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SECTION 1 (C) SIGNIFICANT OPERATIONAL OR INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

1. (U) General: The battalion engaged in combat operations throughout the ninety-two day reporting period. Most operations continued to be in the area between Pleiku and the Cambodian border; however one battery was detached for a portion of the quarter to operate on the coast near Tuy Hoa. The battalion completed one year in Vietnam during the period with a consequent large turn-over in personnel. The battalion continued to provide support for RVN and Free World Military Assistance Forces within its sector.

2. (U) Intelligence: Batteries have occupied positions adjacent to Special Forces camps during much of the period. Close liaison has been established with the 4 detachments in these camps and they have proved a fruitful source of target information. Battalion forward observers continue to go on operations with the Special Forces.

3. (C) Operations and Training Activities.

a. Plans: No significant report.

b. Operations:

(1) During the quarter the battalion participated in Operations PAUL REVERE II, III, and IV and Battery A participated in Operation SEWARD. Fire support was provided to the 1st Air Cavalry Division, the 4th Infantry Division, the 3rd Brigade, 25th Division, the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, the 3rd Brigade ROK Capitol Division, several RVN AF units, and in support of Special Forces operations near Duc Co, Plei Me, and Plei Djerong.

(2) A chronological list of significant operational activities during the period follows:

1 Aug: Btrys A and D, located at Duc Co and Plei Me, continued attachment to 3rd Bde, 25th Div, Bn(-) at base camp, coord ZL 229 534, north of Pleiku, attached to 52d Arty Group.

3 Aug: Btrys A and D detached 3rd Bde, 25th Div and attached to 1st Air Cav Div, given a mission of GSR 1st Bn, 77th Arty.

9 - 10 Aug: Btry A provided support to ROK elements located in the "Dry Lake" area west of Duc Co. Received credit for a significant portion of the body count. 1st Air Cav Div Arty estimated 150 enemy KIA due to their firing.

15 Aug: Sections 3 and 4, 1st Plt, Btry B, 29th Arty (SFG), detached and attached to 52d Arty Group.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report on Lessons Learned (cont'd) (1 November 1966)

18 Aug: Btry A fired 45 rounds via coord YA 729209 and received credit for a body count of 32.

26 Aug: Btrys A and D detached from 1st Air Cav Div and given mission of GSR 2d Bn, 9th Arty, DS Bn of the 3rd Bde, 25th Div.

5 Sep: Btry B departed base camp to relieve Btry A at Duc Co. Btry closed on 6 Sep.

7 Sep: Btry A(-) closed base camp from Duc Co.

9 Sep: Remaining elements, Btry A, closed base camp.

17 Sep: Btry A(-) departed base camp for Tuy Hoa. Road marched to Qui Nhon, picking up two M110s from 3rd Bn, 18th Arty enroute. Boarded LST and moved to Tuy Hoa area.

20 Sep: Btrys B and D placed under operational control of 3rd Bde, 25th Div. Remained at Duc Co and Plei Mo.

23 Sep: Btry A(-) debarked from LST and was attached to the 5th Bn, 27th Arty. Mission to support Free World Military Assistance Forces on Operation SEWARD.

10 Oct: Btry C detached from 3rd Bn, 18th Arty, and returned to control of battalion.

15 Oct: Two 175mm guns from Btry A, the battalion FDC, and support elements departed base camp for Plei Djereng Special Forces Camp.

18 Oct: Btry A(-) and attachments closed Plei Djereng. Placed under operational control of 3rd Bde, 25th Div.

23 Oct: All previous attachments and statuses rescinded. Battalion placed under operational control of 4th Div. Btry A(-) GS; Btrys B and D GSR, 4th Bn, 42d Arty.

25 Oct: Btry A(-) closed base camp from Tuy Hoa. Two 175mm guns and all other equipment except small arms and personal gear were left in Tuy Hoa and turned over to the 3rd Bn, 18th Arty. Two 8 inch howitzers and equipment necessary to replace those items left behind were picked up in an Khe from the 3rd Bn, 18th Arty.

26 Oct: Btry A(-) closed at Plei Djereng. Unit now complete.

c. Training: Unit and on-the-job training predominated during the period. A training team from Fort Sill visited the battalion 17 - 24 Oct to give maintenance instruction on the M107 and M110 weapons. New arrivals received replacement training.

d. Chemical: No significant activities.

e. PSYWAR: No significant activities.

f. Other: No significant activities.

## 4. (U) Logistics.

a. Class I, III and V supplies presented few problems during this quarter. Batteries in the field were supplied by ground convoy and by aerial delivery. Ground convoys were run by this unit, and by support units to Plei Mo six times, Duc Co four times, and Plei Djereng one time. Security for convoys was provided by the 3rd Bde, 25th Div. Forward supply points were set up and operated by support elements at both Duc Co and Plei Djereng. CV-2 and C-123 aircraft were used to resupply all locations. CH-47s were available on a very limited basis.

b. Support has been provided by the 88th Supply and Services Bn and the 149th Ord Co (DS). The support has been outstanding within their capabilities.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report on Lessons Learned (cont'd) (1 November 1966)

5. (U) Civil Affairs: No significant report.

6. (U) Personnel:

a. Casualties:

(1) KIA: None.

(2) WIA: None.

b. During the period the following personnel actions occurred:

(1) Personnel losses: 215

(2) Personnel gains: 165

(3) Present for duty strength at close of period: 33 Off,

4 WO, 519 EM.

(4) Promotion allocations:

(a) E-4 - 30

(b) E-5 - 22

(c) E-6 - 11

(5) Mail: Delivered daily except for four days.

(6) R & R quotas during period:

(a) 87 out-of-country.

(b) 13 in-country

(7) Pay has been timely and accurate.

(8) Twenty-four EM, grades E-3 through E-9 were retained beyond their normal DEPOS due to delay in reception of redeployment orders.

7. (C) Artillery: Rounds expended during period.

WEAPON	TYPE	FUZE	AMOUNT	AMOUNT EXPENDED IN-COUNTRY
8" How	HE	PD	8371	15,717
		CVT	25	76
		MISQ	265	554
		TOTAL	8661	16,347
175mm Gun	HE	PD	8129	16,289
		CVT	196	818
		TOTAL	8325	17,107

8. (U) Other: No significant activities.

## SECTION 2 (C) Commander's Observations and Recommendations.

### PART I, Observations (Lessons Learned)

1. (U) Personnel: None.

2. (C) Operations:

a. Item: Tube life of 175mm gun.

Discussion: Present restrictions severely limit the number of rounds that can be fired through each 175mm gun tube. This has necessitated frequent retubing convoys to field locations that have placed an additional burden on battalion and support maintenance personnel, and on the maneuver units who must provide convoy security. Additionally, there is the constant danger of damaging components of the weapon each time the tube is changed. It is felt that some of the present maintenance problems with the guns may well be caused by past changes.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report on Lessons Learned (cont'd) (1 November 1966)

Observation: Redistribution of heavy artillery weapons in the artillery group has done much to alleviate this problem. Each battery now has two 175mm guns and two 8-inch howitzers. A high percentage of the targets on which the battery fires are located within range of the 8-inch howitzers, and these weapons with their long tube life are used. Visual reconnaissance, agent reports, and SPAR reports continue to locate targets beyond 8-inch range, but within the fan of the 175mm guns, and all batteries now have the capability of firing on them. When lucrative, fleeting targets are located within 8-inch range, both guns and howitzers have been massed with no FDC problems.

3. (U) Training and Organization: None.
4. (U) Intelligence: None.
5. (U) Logistics: None.
6. (U) Other: None.

## PART II, Recommendations

1. (U) Personnel: None.
2. (C) Operations:

a. With three firing batteries located in field positions, remote from base camp, all command, operational, logistics, and administrative traffic must be passed over radio nets. FM nets have been used in the past for virtually all traffic. An additional AN/GRC-46 was obtained during the redistribution of equipment that took place in converting the battalion to a composite organization. This set is located with one of the firing batteries and the resulting use of AM nets has significantly reduced the traffic on FM. Recommend that each firing battery have an AM radio capability.

b. With batteries in widely scattered field locations, it is essential that aircraft be available for command visits, resupply, administration, and rapid delivery of parts and technical personnel necessary to remove combat essential equipment from a deadline status. Additionally, a large majority of the battalion's firing is unobserved using Met + VE techniques. This requires an accurate knowledge of the VE's of all weapons with all charges. The VE's can be obtained only by registering frequently with air observers. When aircraft have been available on a daily basis, command visits, resupply of critical items, and registrations have been accomplished. Recommend that each battalion be allocated at least one aircraft daily.

3. (U) Training and Organization: None.
4. (U) Intelligence: None.
5. (U) Logistics: None.
6. (U) Other: None.

*Andrew Mansinne Jr.*  
ANDREW MANSINNE JR.  
LTC, Artillery  
Commanding

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AVFA-AT-52-CO (1 Nov 66)

1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period  
ending 31 October 1966

Headquarters, 52d Artillery Group, APO 96295 4 November 1966

TO: Commanding Officer, I FFORCEV Artillery, APO 96350

1. Forwarded herewith is the Operational Report, subject as above,  
for 6th Battalion, 14th Artillery.

2. Concur in observations and recommendations contained in basic  
communications.

3. With the wide separation of batteries in RVN, many times AM com-  
munications is the only means of contacting units. Thus it is highly de-  
sireable that all heavy artillery batteries be issued a radio set AN/GRC 46  
or similar AM set. Aircraft are needed due to distances involved and in-  
accessability by roads.

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*O. L. Tobiason*  
O. L. TOBIASON  
Colonel Artillery  
Commanding

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AVFA-AT-D (1 Nov 66)

2d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period  
Ending 31 October 1966, 6th Bn, 11th Arty) (U)

HEADQUARTERS, I FIELD FORCE VIETNAM ARTILLERY, APO 96350, 28 Nov 66

TO: Commanding General, I Field Force Vietnam, ATTN: AVFA-GC-O&T  
APO 96350

1. (U) This headquarters concurs with and strongly recommends approval of the recommendations contained in Section 2 of basic correspondence.

2. (U) Action has been initiated to prepare recommended TOE changes for the following:

a. A composite 175-mm/8-inch battalion.

b. Addition of an AM radio section to each of the firing batteries in the composite battalion.

3. (U) Aviation support for non-divisional artillery units in I FFORCEV has been, and continues to be a serious problem. Separate correspondence will be submitted on this subject.

*Ashley A. Blinn*

ASHLEY A. BLINN  
Colonel, Artillery  
Commanding

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AVFA-GC-O&T (1 Nov 66)

3d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October  
1966 (RCS CSFOR-65)

Headquarters, I Field Force Vietnam, APO US Forces 96350 14 DEC 1966

TO: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, APO US Forces 96307

This headquarters concurs with comments and recommendations  
contained in basic report.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

*William H. James*  
WILLIAM H. JAMES  
Colonel, AGC  
Adjutant General

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AVHGC-DH (1 Nov 66)

4th Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending  
31 October 1966 (RCS CSFOR-65)HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96307  
02 JAN 1967TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-OT  
APO 96558

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the period ending 31 October 1966 from Headquarters, 6th Battalion, 14th Artillery as indorsed.

2. Pertinent comments are as follows:

a. Reference Paragraph 2a, Part II, Section 2, Page 4; Paragraph 3, 1st Indorsement; and Paragraph 2, 2d Indorsement. Concur in observations of the basic report. Organic FM communications should remain the primary means of radio communications within the Artillery Battalion. However, with the wide separation of batteries of the 6th Battalion, 14th Artillery, AM radio capability should be authorized. This exception is based on the unusual problems experienced by this particular Battalion. As stated in the 2d Indorsement, an MTOE is being prepared to request authorization of additional AM radios.

b. Reference Paragraph 2b, Part II, Section 2, Page (4) and Paragraph 3, 2d Indorsement: Combat Support and Combat Service Support Units deploy with Aviation Sections at zero strength in personnel and equipment, due to policy established by Department of the Army. This policy will not change in the near future and was initiated because of the world wide shortage of aviation assets. Until this is alleviated, Combat Support Units will have a continuing problem and must rely on their parent unit for required Aviation Support.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



R. J. THORNTON  
1st Lt. AGC  
Asst Adjutant General

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GPOP-OT (1 Nov 66) 5th Ind (U)  
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending  
31 October 1966 (RCS CSFOR-65)

HQ, US ARMY, PACIFIC, APO San Francisco 96558 30 JAN 1967

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the  
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in the basic report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

  
G. L. McMULLIN  
CPT, AGO  
Asst AG

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